This is an essay I wrote back in college. The assignment was to take one of the philosophical arguments for God and write an essay on it.
A Moral Defense of God
Society has begun a new quest:
We must seek, in the very heart of religious conceptions, those moral realities that are, as it were, lost and dissimulated in it. We must disengage them, find out what they consist of, determine their proper nature, and express them in rational language. In a word, we must discover the rational substitutes for those religious notions that for a long time have served as the vehicle for the most essential moral ideas. (Durkheim 9)
William James argues for the same point when he writes, "'The religion of humanity' affords a basis for ethics as well as theism" (198). However, William James and Emile Durkheim are incorrect. Human reason is not and cannot be the basis of morals rather, the existence of uniform morals in the world affirms a standard beyond human creation, namely 'god'.
First, all moral values are uniform in some way. What is affirmed in this statement is that when we examine the scope of society there is a general moral value of some kind. When this paper argues for uniform morals it is not denying cultural distinctions and difference, rather it is arguing for similarity that has tethered all societies together at some level. C.S. Lewis contends, "Human beings all over the earth have this curious idea that they ought to behave in a certain way. . ." (Mere 21). Throughout history morals can be seen as based on some objective standard. We cannot deny the moral similarities among civilizations. Without denying differences C.S. Lewis affirms that there are striking moral similarities throughout history and culture:
There have been differences between their moralities, but these have never amounted to anything like a total difference . If anyone will take the trouble to compare the moral teaching of say, ancient Egyptians, Babylonians, Hindus, Chinese, Greeks and Romans, what will strike him will be how very like they are to each other and to our own. (Mere 19)
One striking similarity is the belief in some form of universal truth. Hindus believe in the Rta, the "great ritual or pattern of nature and supernature which is revealed alike in the cosmic order" (Lewis Abolition 27). For Plato there was "the Good [that] was 'beyond existence'" (Lewis Abolition 27). The Chinese believed in the Tao which was "reality beyond all predicates, the abyss that was before the Creator Himself." and "the ancient Jews praised the Law as being true" (Lewis Abolition 28).
C.S. Lewis is also quite precise in his documentation of more specific examples in the appendix of his book The Abolition of Man. Certain moral standards, such as murder is wrong, have been maintained among the cultures of history. [1] What can account for these similarities?
In his novel, Thus Spake Zarathstra, Nietzsche uses the fictional character to argue "That anything at all is good and evil- that is his [man's] creation" (Qtd. in Hoover 112). Certainly societies have risen and fallen at the hands of great men but does that necessitate that man has created his own standards? This view of the origin of morals does not do justice to the evidence of moral standards throughout the ages. If man merely created morals according to his own taste we would assume that moral standards would be as different as black and white. Rather, what we see is that we are comparing shades of blue. There may be differences but each color is still inherently blue.
There must be some moral uniformity. For example, in the years following World War II the various nations of the world, Israel in particular, embarked on a manhunt for Nazi war criminals. The criminals were then tried before an international court. What basis was there for such a trial? The trials were not simply because the Allies won the war but because there was a belief that there was a moral standard that the Nazis were accountable to.
William James argues that "there can be no final truth in ethics any more than in physics, until that last man has had his experience and said his way" (184). He would argue that morality is relative to the observer. He supports a universal principle of a different kind. For him, "the essence of good is simply to satisfy demand. . . The various ideals have no more common character apart from the fact that they are ideals" (201).
This view fails to do justice to the evidence of uniformity. If good is only that which satisfies demand, then morals are again reduced to the creation of man, or his demands. To refute both Nietzsche and James consider the words of C.S. Lewis:
It is no more possible to invent a new ethics than to place a new sun in the sky. Some precept from traditional morality always has to be assumed. We never start from a tabula rasa: if we did, we should end, ethically speaking, with a tabula rasa. New moralities can only be contractions or expansions of something already given. And all the specifically modern attempts at new moralities are contractions. (Christian 53)
Even if we limit good to the satisfying of demands, as James attempts to do, we still have clung to at least a bare thread of traditional morality. The further and further we continue down this dark path the closer we move to total anarchy. Even in a state of anarchy, each individual still would declare something as good and bad. This raped form of morality is not a new morality at all as we are led to believe but merely a perverse contraction.
There is no moral vacuum in which man or group can create a new moral. Rather, as Kenneth Boa states, "The idea of right versus wrong and good versus bad is firmly entrenched in the human mind, and it is consistently displayed in the human experience" (154). Even those who argue for subjective moral values would probably not hesitate to shout, "That is not fair!" if there accountant cheated them out of their entire life's investments.
What we see is evidence of uniform morals which cannot be explained as man's creation. The evidence of a standard seems to concur with the writer of Ecclesiastes when he wrote, "There is nothing new under the sun. Is there anything of which one can say, 'Look! This is something new'?" (1:9b,10a).
Second, the uniformity of morals points to a standard which must be beyond man's creation, a god. In the above section we have seen evidence of a standard and argued that cannot be explained as man's own creation. We will argue that in order for the evidenced uniform morals to be explained we must look to an objective standard beyond man.
Merriam-Webster's Dictionary defines moral as "of or relating to principles of right or wrong in behavior" (756). To have truly have a principle, i.e. a moral, there must be someone to give that moral. Or more simply put to have a law there must be a lawgiver. All modern countries that have a set of laws for their government trace those laws back to someone or some group. These laws or principles go beyond the mere facts. Facts tell us, "A happened and then B and C happened." But beyond that there is a value judgement. Morals dive deeper and tell us, "A was right and B and C were wrong" or "B and C ought not to happen." How can we account for this? Can we account for this value judgement or must we reduce it to the subjective relativity of man's reason?
The evidence we examined under the first premise points out that there is a human desire to define this standard of moral. Without an objective standard there would be no uniformity between cultures as we examined.
William James denies all objectivity entirely. He argues in the physical world there are no morals only facts. The idea of 'oughtness', or morals, can only be discussed from a personal perspective. He states that, "Moral relations now [once human perspective is introduced] have their status, in that being's consciousness. So far as he feels anything to be good, he makes it good" (190-1, Emphasis his). But moral values that are reduced to a human standard really carry no value or weight to them. They fall short of the definition of a moral, instead of a principle they become a suggestion. Without a standard a moral is not a moral at all. It becomes what one person suggests is right. Why does he suggest its right? He made it right. Kenneth Boa points out the flaws of subjectivity stating, "If these values are based solely on human experiences and subjective feelings, there is a real problem when people criticize or appeal to moral values, they are appealing to something which in their minds is self-evident and objective" (155-6).
Emile Durkheim suggested that we can and we must wrestle morals away from any and all religious basis. His goal was "a completely rational moral education, that is to say, excluding all principles derived from religion" (19). He proposed that we do this without letting morality lose any of its basic elements. In other words, where traditional morals taught us that "God says, thou shalt not kill." We can merely erase the "God says" and hold up the "thou shalt. . ." and our morals will be sufficient.
As we have shown this is an insufficient treatment of morals. It is not a new moral but a reductionism, as one can plainly see. To Emile Durkheim our reason will naturally validate this moral as a true and acceptable moral standard. The moral becomes a moral that man created. Because we deleted the "God says" (the religious basis) we walk along the same lines as Zarathustra when he declared, "What is good and evil no one knows yet, unless it be he who creates. He, however creates man's goals and gives the earth its meaning and future" (112).
Arlie Hoover, who analyzed Nietsche's contribution to the Holocaust, is quick to point out the past failures of denying an objective standard. She comments, "there is no universal morality, that morality is purely a human creation, that good and evil are determined by creators, great individuals, powerful men- the Nazis will find these ideas very helpful in fashioning their worldview" (112).
Most are quick to condemn the Nazi atrocities. But we tend to move down that path when we indorse subjectivity of any kind, whether group or individual. Mounce warns us of the dangers of relativism:
It is inherently unstable. On reflection, it collapses into a relativism of individual form. In short, a morality which is relative to the general will soon reduces itself to a morality which is relative to my will. For if I am at all reflective, I shall soon find myself wondering why, if there is a conflict between the two, I should follow the general will rather than my own. (281, Emphasis his)
The last comment this writer would like to make is more theological because Dr. Nichols has stated, "We cannot talk about philosophy as if theology does not exist." When we attempt to place morals solely in the subjective hands of man's reason merely we affirm man's prideful sinful self. The Westminster Confession summarizes the Bible's portrayal of man's condition as "dead in sin, and wholly defiled in all the parts and faculties of soul and body" (Qtd. in Reymond 446). Man cannot claim to be without sin (1 John 1:8,10 et al). Any moral that man attempts to set man's own reason as a standard will fall short and decay because man himself is sinful.
What this paper has argued then is first, there is evidence of uniform morals. While the exactness of them differ from culture to culture there is still a commonality that cannot be denied, or downplayed. The uniformity of morals point to a standard beyond man; for if the standard is not beyond man the morals by definition cease to be morals. They turn into suggestions that one can choose not to follow. What we have shown is that, contrary to Emile Durkheim, standards cannot be taken from religion and given to man's reason. We defend the existence of an objective moral standard beyond man, i.e. god.
We have not defended nor was it our attempt to completely defend the Christian God of the Bible. Rather, we showed that morals demand something above man. Let us close with the words of C.S. Lewis:
These may be fine speculations: yet I believe that nothing short of this [a Divine God] can save us. A Christianity which does not see moral and religious experience converging to meet at infinity, not at a negative infinity, but in the positive infinity of the living yet superpersonal God, has nothing, in the long run to divide it from devil worship; and a philosophy which does not accept value as eternal and objective can lead us only to ruin. (Christian 80-1)
Bibliography
The Bible. The New International Version. 1984.
Boa, Kenneth. "What is Behind Morality?" Bibliotheca Sacra. Vol. 133. April-June 1976.
153-64.
Durkheim, Emile. Moral Education: A Study in Theory and Application of Sociology of Education. Ed. Everett Wilson. Trans. Everett K. Wilson and Herman Schnurer. New York: Free Press. 1961.
Hoover, Arlie. "Who speaks for life? Nietzsche's Contribution to the Holocaust." Restoration Quarterly. Vol. 40(2). 1998. 109-23.
James, William. The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy and Human Immortality. (Both bound as one). New York: Dover Publications. 1960.
Lewis, C.S. The Abolition of Man. New York: Macmillian. 1947.
_____. Christian Reflections. Grand Rapids, MI.: Eerdmans. 1967.
_____. Mere Christianity. New York: Macmillian. 1952.
Mounce, H.O. "Morality and religion." Philosophy of Religion. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 1998. 253-85.
Nichols, Stephen. Introduction to Western Philosophy. Lancaster Bible College: Lancaster, Pa. Class Lecture. Oct. 9, 2000.
Reymond, Robert. A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith. Nashville: Thomas Nelson Pub. 1998.
[1] The purpose of this paper is not to examine and compare moral standards of these cultures but to make us aware of their existence. The list of examples one could give are quite extensive, if one requires specifics beyond the scope of this paper, this writer suggests starting with The Abolition of Man. C.S. Lewis includes an appendix with examples.
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